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ABSTRACT
Today, vehicles are an important source of digital evidence in criminal investigations. Modern day
cars store a wealth of digital information, including recent destinations, favorite locations, routes,
and personal data, such as call logs, contact lists, SMS messages, pictures, and videos. Moreover,
the growth of in-vehicle sensors and event data recorders, which continually provide feedback to
automobile manufacturers and third-parties, provide tremendous potential for forensics examiners.
Recently, the field of vehicle forensics research has caught the attention of both digital forensics
investigators and academics. To date, most relevant research have conventionally focused on digital
traces of multimedia and GPS systems found in vehicles. However, today vehicles are manufactured
with a vast array of communication options, including Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and NFC (Near Field
Communication). Up until recently, these options were reserved only for the more expensive
automotive models; nonetheless these capabilities are now available for just about all vehicle models.
However, these vehicle communications and their corresponding networks have not been explored
in detail as they relate to traditional digital investigations. Consequently, this paper focuses on the
communications produced by modern vehicles and identifies relevant and important artefacts.
Furthermore, as a case study, we examine types of data that can be captured, and methods used to
extract artefacts from this data.
Keywords: Vehicle forensics , vehicle communication, vehicle security, forensic case study,
Mercedes Benz car forensics
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1. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle forensics is a relatively recent field of
study, which has garnered interest from both
academics and digital forensics investigators.
Recent advances in technology, coupled with
the introduction of new regulations, have
generated more digital data and, consequently,
provides a new source of valuable evidence for
investigators. In terms of regulation, in some
countries the government has mandated that all
vehicles be manufactured with an event data
recorder (EDR) , or "black box", which
continually captures data points that include
speed, reliability of brakes, seat belt usage and
many other important metrics. Other advances
in technology have created new sources of
evidence for investigators. The integration of
smart vehicle technologies, which are often
based on open source operating systems, create
even more digital breadcrumbs. For example,
most digital entertainment systems, are based
on Android, and come standard with vehicles
today. It has become commonplace for our
smartphones to automatically connect, via
Bluetooth, with our vehicles and to synchronize
the contacts from our smartphones to our cars.
Moreover, vehicle navigation systems, which
generally come standard with vehicles today,
wealth of information for
provide a
investigators.
Vehicle navigation system
evidence can include trackpoints, waypoints,
track logs and routes, among others.
Today, vehicles contain a plethora of
communication options, including Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth and NFC. Automobile manufacturer
Mercedes Benz has been a pioneer in developing
cutting-edge information technologies, many of
which were first tested in their A-Class models
in an effort to gain big data feedback from their
consumers.
The present-day existence of information
technology in vehicles, and its use by vehicle
manufacturers, began in 2002 with FMS (Fleet
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Management
which
allowed
System) ,
manufacturers to record live telemetry data,
export it and, if necessary, provide real-time
advice to truck owners to mitigate the risk of
damage or prevent accidents. This information
has resulted in companies being able to provide
the optimal time and place where parts should
be exchanged on a route and when inspections
should be scheduled to avoid excessive delays.
The increase in bandwidth in the mobile
communications sector and the desire of
customers to be permanently available creates
an even greater digital footprint. These
communication
technologies
were
also
introduced in passenger cars. Initially, cars
maintained a Bluetooth transmitter to facilitate
connections to the user's smartphone, but this
has morphed into a GSM module, with a
Bluetooth connection, NFC and Wi-Fi adapters
[10]. These integrated vehicle communications
have been further advanced with the
introduction of Google Auto and CarPlay.
Manufacturers develop applications to make the
use of their vehicle smarter for the driver.
Vehicle software updates occur wirelessly, and
they also regularly transmit their telemetry data
to the manufacturer. Tesla models communicate
with other Tesla vehicles when in close
proximity, which also facilitates updates.
The aforementioned discussion illustrates
how automobiles no longer simply rely on the
on-board storage of data but rather appear to
be closer to the concept of a Smart Home
network [14]. Moreover, on-board vehicle
memory is now merely used as a local cache.
Thus, there have been significant changes in
vehicle
networking,
data
storage,
communication and the user experience. These
dramatic changes have not been adequately
addressed in the academic literature or by
digital forensics investigators. Instead, they
continue to rely on existing, well-known
practices,
including
monitoring
telecommunications and evaluating radio cell
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telemetry, to in-vehicle network modules
(Wi-Fi, NFC , and Bluetooth) and
remote
vehicle
connections
via
smartphone applications; and

data, or have focused on the extraction of data
stored in the memory chip [11] .
On the other hand, this permanent
communication also poses a danger to deployed
forces, which influence traffic behavior and
location data due to this uncontrolled outflow of
data and the potential for external influence,
without any physical influence on the vehicle.
Furthermore, the entire storage of vehicle data
also represents a danger to manufacturers for
concealed / legendary working forces, as a
legend would have to be extended to these
points. For example, human trafficking is one of
the most frequently committed crimes today. To
date, the investigator has aspired to gather data
from navigation systems and smartphones. If
this evidence was not used, a smuggling ring was
difficult to profile, as routes taken were not
detected. Utilizing the recorded telemetry data,
by means of the aforementioned FMS , one
would be able to determine the route, its
duration and rates of speed. Amongst other
recorded metrics, contents of the FMS include
vehicle speed, service and distance [1]. This
shows that manufacturers store information
that
may
be critically important
to
investigations.
The purpose of this paper is to study
communication data between the vehicle and
the vehicle manufacturer, their value to
investigators and the threat to their own
assigned forces of security authorities.
According to current opinion, data recorded
from the vehicle flows directly to the vehicle
manufacturer.
Verified
communication
processes, representations of content and
established data protocols could not be detected
during the research phase. The contributions of
this paper are:

•

An innovative approach to analyzing
data from vehicle communications;

•

the
Explain
communication
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differences
protocols,

m
from

•

A case study on a 2016 Mercedes Benz
E-Class model.

The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows. In the next section, we briefly review
related work in the context of vehicle forensics.
We present our research approach in Section 3,
and then the case study is highlighted in Section
4. We then describe our findings and analysis in
Section 5. We provide a conclusion and discuss
future work in Section 6.

2. RELATED WORK
Cars today contain a system similar to a
network of computers with both wired and
wireless connections. Hence, the probability for
misuse of these communications has increased.
Moreover, since many standards and protocols
are identical to home networks, identical
vulnerabilities exist [2].
Berla [3] with their iVe forensics tool, has
been the preeminent force in vehicle forensics in
recent times. The forensics data extracted can
include travel routes taken by the driver, media,
location information and connected devices.
In 2011 , at the Usenix 2011, Checkoway et
al presented an overview of the attack interfaces
of a modern car [4]. Car manufacturers are not
equipped to deal with these high-tech attacks,
while network vulnerabilities persist.
Car hacking continues to be problematic
today, whereby a hacker could actually
endanger the lives of people in a car by taking
over the steering wheel or applying brakes. For
example, a Jeep was hacked by Valasek and
Miller, who presented at DefCon 2015 and the
details of the compromised vehicle were
described in a recent white paper [5]. Of
particular note was their ability to control the
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steering wheel and make the car "turn sharp left"
and then veer off the road. Another note is that
they managed to successfully query every Jeep
and car, with the same on-board unit, and
determine their present location. It was however
challenging to communicate with a single car, as
opposed to communicating with just one
targeted vehicle.
Research conducted by ADAC, the German
automobile club, discovered several weaknesses
in BMW's ConnectedDrive [6]. It prompted
BMW to introduce HTTPS connections to the
factory, instead of maintaining weaker HTTP
connections.
Research conducted by the FIA in 2015,
entitled "My car, My data" provided an
overview of the data a car is collecting [7] on
both drivers and passengers. It should be noted
that not all similar data is sent over a mobile
connection, while it can be read by the
maintenance software of the manufacturer.
In a briefing note, BigBrotherWatch.UK
made several startling statements about the
potential misuse of e-call [8]. Interpol informed
the Sunday Times that e-call is already used by
some police forces to track cars [9].
Apart from the technical possibilities, an
ethical discussion arises if all of these
possibilities can be used to fight crimes. One
opinion is that by embarking on a life of crime,
you are willingly sacrificing your privacy.
Conversely, another opinion is that innocent
citizens should not have to sacrifice their
privacy [15].
In [10], the authors described some of the
challenges associated with digital forensic
investigations of vehicle systems. They
demonstrated how artefacts of forensic interest
could be recovered from the various electronic
modules and placed such as memory chips of the
entertainment system in a Volkswagen car.
They did not discuss the vehicle communication
data.
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The authors in [11] addressed vehicle
communications by demonstrating how to
analyze mobile wireless data to examine the
location and use of a vehicle.

3.PROBLEM
STATEMENT
Nowadays, vehicles reside within a network
where data is collected, transported and
analyzed. More and more vehicles communicate
with the automaker's server, via the provider's
installed IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber
Identity) , while telemetry controllers are
directly connected to the automaker's data
center. Additionally, automobile exhibitors have
already implemented an eCall called TPS
(Third Party Service) in their systems. This
protocol transmits a greater level of encrypted
data in comparison to the EU directive and with
the EU eCall service [16]. The manufacturers
may continue to offer their own emergency
service, TPS-eCall, as an alternative, in addition
to being able to offer additional services. This
will allow additional information to be obtained
despite encryption. Statements made by the
security authorities, in reference to the eCall
system, view the system as being politically
sensitive since the system has been a target for
malware (backdoor) , which impacts some EU
countries. Access to TPS systems, by the
security authorities, has been facilitated with
court orders. However, access to these systems
has been quite restrictive. In this case, the carsharing operator would initially hand the data
over to the court for evaluation, in response to
an order from a higher regional court. These
data were not handed over to the police
investigative office. The opportunity to gain
deeper insight into the communication process
improves the probability of obtaining while also
being more targeted. As a result , investigators
and forensic scientists are faced with a quandary
in the absence of legal standardization for this
data, which in turn cannot be collected.
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In fact, data generated by devices connected
to a Wi-Fi hotspot, is assumed to be the
property of the official provider. Generally
speaking, it is currently a complex matter to
gain usable data from the communication traffic
of vehicles. Most traffic is encrypted using SSL
/ TLS in the TCP / IP model, and found within
the transport layer. In addition, the encryption
of data directly after its creation within the used
system is of importance, as well as data which
are kept ready for transport. This poses a
problem for investigators and forensics analysts
since the data is not readily available to be
captured, analyzed and processed.
Hence, the aim of this paper is to recognize
how
vehicles
and
computing
centers
communicate and which communication
structures can be identified. Data is transmitted
and analyzed by means of telecommunication
monitoring. Nevertheless, it is important to
clarify whether the previously legally required
data is still sufficient or whether an adaptation
of laws and technical systems is required. The
existing traffic and its analysis are determined
by the possible communication directions
available via the Internet, for which a network
module controls different communication paths:
(i) Telemetry; (ii) Manufacturer Smartphone
application remotely connected to the vehicle;
(iii) Smart Device.
In order to achieve the aforementioned
objectives, the approach should be determined
by
the
network
protocols
and
telecommunication
data,
so
that
(i)
communication directions can be tapped, (ii)
protocols are recognized, (iii) content is
evaluated and (iv) the necessary adjustments to
systems and legal bases are recognized.

4. CASE STUDY
4 .1

E:xperiinent PJatform

For this research paper, a Debian-based
operating system, Kali Linux 2017.3, was used.

@ 2019 ADFSL

CDFSL Proceedings 2019
Wireshark v.2.4.6 was utilized to process
archive files and parse individual frames. Dshell,
with Decode v.3.0, was used for an advanced
analysis of the converted files. A breakdown of
the routes, addresses, and the associated stored
content was performed with the OSINT (Open
Source Intelligence) tool Devploit v .3.6.
The warden data packets, derived from the
network traffic between the vehicle and server
platform, are required. Through existing frames ,
and the information contained therein, an
analysis can be performed, and a conclusion
established.
To perform this procedure, a vehicle model
with a GSM/ UMTS (Universal Mobile
Telecommunications Service) module, which
was a Mercedes-Benz E350 built in 2016, was
selected. Using this module, all data generated
within the vehicle, via control units,
infotainment system, navigation system,
Bluetooth and WiFi, we deactivated. To obtain
a comprehensive overview, we collected data via
telecommunication diversion. As a result ,
various file formats were created and
subsequently converted. The stored data
includes information about all of the systems
involved, the time that the network connection
was established, the amount of data, the route
of the data transfer, the protocols and services.
The vehicle can only be monitored if the
IMEi
(International
Mobile
Equipment
Number) or the IMSI is transmitted to the
provider. Since the data was not available on
request from the vehicle dealer, the vehicle was
monitored using an IMSI catcher. The mobile
standard for each vehicle module can
communicate while the IMSI is activated
(Nederland, Vodafone
Libertel
in
our
experiments)
A connection was established using a data
call number + 882 39XXXXXXXXXX and this
carrier code represents a number from Vodafone
Malta and is listed under International
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Networks. This phone number is used to open
and keep a data port using the GPRS service.
Within the telecommunications monitoring
system, only the outgoing call could be
determined, and the phone number of the other
party was unrecognizable. Subsequently, the
various file formats and their functions were
presented and followed by a complete telemetry
communication between the control units of the
vehicle and the target servers addressed by the
various protocols.

4.2

Data.

In our case study, the raw data was collected by
a third party, i.e. the provider, who adjusted the
data
to
comply
with
the
German
Telecommunications Act.

Snoop files
The creation of the snoop files builds on the
provider-created raw data. As previously
mentioned, we are referring only data that the
provider is obliged to produce by law. The snoop
format was selected based on the underlying
architecture
of
the
telecommunications
surveillance system. The telecommunication
system wardens the raw data by communication
string and converts it into a snoop archive. In
order to carry out an analysis of this data, by
means of the aforementioned programs, they
were exported from the telecommunication
system. Only pure network data, not
telecommunication data can be exported. The
disadvantage is that the connection cannot be
represented by means of data packets.

pcap files
The pcap format stands for packet capture
and utilizes a free network interface. By creating
network data with the extension pcap, network
analysis tools can analyze and process this data
offline.
The Snoop files are probabilistic Oracle
Solaris archives. Although they are compatible
with Wireshark, they are built on Kali Linux
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command line utilities, e.g. it is not possible to
use the network forensics framework Dshell (US
Army Research Lab), as these concerted .pcap
archives contain significant deficiencies in the
information they contain. This deficiency is
caused by the provider itself, as it represents a
data overload for him. For example, this is
characterized by missing MAC addresses in
individual frames.
As
previously
mentioned,
the
telecommunication monitoring system created
archives for the communication setup /
execution. For analysis and research of the
communication channels these archives were
summarized daily.
4. 3

Car Telerri.etcy Inforrriation

By definition, telemetry represents the remote
measurement and transmission of measured
values of a sensor (control unit) located at a
measuring location (vehicle) to a spatially
separate location. This receiving station can
collect, record and / or evaluate this data. The
telemetry method used in this area is referred to
as far field telemetry, since the measurement
data is transmitted over longer distances.
During our experimentation, our tests were
performed
using
an
integrated
eSim
GSM/ UMTS module. As a protocol for data
transmission, the G PRS protocol (General
Packet Radio Service) was used. The 2017 test
vehicle utilized an LTE (Long-Term Evolution)
module.

GPRS
GPRS is a packet-oriented service, which
allows a connection to be maintained without
permanently reserving a radio channel. Only in
a real data transmission, the radio room is
occupied and is locked for other users. Another
reason why this protocol is used is that delivery
costs are calculated by volume of data rather
than duration of connection.

Akamai Technologies
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Akamai Technologies, Inc. is an American
content delivery network (CDN) and cloud
service provider. Akamai's Content Delivery
Network covers between 15% and 30% of all web
traffic. [3] This hardware deployment represents
a speed increase for website operators, as it
always drives the server closest to the end user.
This means that no original web pages of the
domain are accessed, but web page copies on
servers of Akamai Technologies.

4. 4

Car Application Information

For vehicle models with GSM / UMTS / LTE
modules, the vehicle manufacturer offers
applications for smartphone users.
These provide the potential for (i) remote
control of the vehicle, (ii) information transfer
from current events, and (iii) personalization of
ECUs (Engine Control Unit).
The connection between the application and
the vehicle communication servers are outside of
the telemetry network. The use of the
application (s) requires registration and
activation by the vehicle owner at the vehicle
manufacturer, as well as the establishment of a
user account. For this device, vehicle data from
the vehicle registration, in addition to proof of
ownership were needed. The following protocols
and procedures were therefore recorded.
This first communication setup
exported and displayed by Wireshark.

was

As previously discussed under Devploit, the
tool displays a variety of servers that are
addressed by the application and supplied with
information. In addition to various paths, that
may have to do with the application itself, there
are also two connections that represent
"places.mercedes-benz.com" and "productionsuite.mercedes-benz.com". Both show yet
another peculiarity that the data traffic is
handed over to Akamai Technologies. The other
available means of communications are via
Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG).
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4. 5

Car hi.tern.et Information

In this section, the communication structure /
process on the World Wide Web is considered.
This consideration is limited to the first
structure / process since all further processes are
identical to a normal Internet communication.
Before a communication to the Internet can
take place, the IMSI of the installed eSIM
module must be activated by the provider. The
activation takes place in the customer center of
the provider personally, an online registration is
not provided. After this activation, devices
connected to the vehicle's Wi-Fi can dial IP
addresses in the public area. Below are
screenshots of the activation phase of the
Internet Inthecar account (Figure 1).
Interestingly, inquiries are initially made to
Google and Apple and only then a request to
Vodafone takes place. Here, was the expectation
that Vodafone's communication platform would
take place first and then the connections of the
operating systems, applications and other data
connections.
This process means that the communication
ports were opened from the outside and an
internal configuration was not required. This is
because Google and Apple made direct inquiries
and set up a communication link.
Another finding is the lack of device
allocation, based on this network data, an
assignment to a device is not possible, which can
be of crucial importance in an investigation.
Furthermore,
no
RTP
(Real-Time
Transport Protocol) stream was detected by
Wireshark, as well as no Wi-Fi traffic. In
contrast, in the package 4043 , http information
was sent which was "hotspot-detect" , which
signals the successful connection to an access
point. Due to the non-existent data, one can
only interpret and speculate which devices are
communicating via the UMTS module at this
time.

Page 7

Vehicle Communication within Networks ...

CDFSL Proceedings 2019
client transmitting data is three times as much
data as the server. This decoder is used to detect
communication irregularities, since usually the
data sent by the server is usually larger than the
one supplied by the client. This may indicate
that the client is sending more information at
once because it has broken connections or
contained information for forwarding to clients
or servers that are not included in the TCP
response of the server. The data obtained
thereby shows us the source IP , which
represents a private IP of the BTS, the
destination IP , which is displayed to us in the
form of an open IP and hereafter unit how many
times more data the client sent to the server
than vice versa. For example:

Monitoring Wi-Fi module

4.6

In order to detect and verify data processing
algorithms, the previous Wi-Fi module was
recorded using airodump-ng. This was done with
a laptop connected to an Alfa Networks Wi-Fi
antenna A WUS036ACH.

4. 7

Artifact ca.pt-ming and
extraction

4 .7.1 Oshell
The program Dshell represents a network
forensic framework, which supports the
decomposition of network acquisitions through
plugins. Using Dshell, the required information
of the pcap file was converted by decoder into a
text file.

10.33.228.130:46861 -> 80.154.131.254:443 **
client sent 9.40 more than the server **

Reverse-flow generates a message if the
client transmits more data than the server. The
default threshold value 3.0, means that the

10.33.228.130:46863 -> 80.154.131.254:443 **
client sent 4.36 more than the server **
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netflow,

Real-Time

Transport

Protocol

(RTP) information were also generated.,

followstream content is displayed in the
same sequence as it appeared on the network.
This decoder was used to represent content of
the data transfer. HTML was used to make the
transport easier to capture. The area shown here
has been reduced by the unreadable, encrypted
areas. Subsequently, a connection between
vehicle and server is shown, it was shown only
data which were freely readable, except for t he
area of the encrypted content data content
which was not verified was deleted for better
representation.

CDFSL Proceedings 2019

shortly after the start of the surveillance. In the
following examples, only the application
compounds per se and hereafter two further
compounds that are not directly used by the
vehicle / application user but are used in direct
connection with the vehicle manufacturer and
the reseller.

InternetlnTheCar. Vodafone. This is a
Dutch eSIM of the provider Vodafone. This
eSIM activated by Vodafone Germany. The
activation
took
place
personally
with
presentation of the identity card in a branch
office of the provider; Resellers are not allowed
to activate this service.

4 . 7. 2 Devploit
The Devploit tool [13] developed to gather
information from Joker Security. It brings
together various OSINT tools in the field of
network reconnaissance. This tool chosen
because, although several products are
combined under one roof, they are not executed
automatically.

Telemetry data. The servers involved and
the communication process show that
investigations in a technical evaluation, without
content analysis , can display modules that
provide new starting points. The following
diagram intended to clarify connection processes
within the IP data network. The connection
establishment and the keeping open of the data
ports takes place via a GPRS call. This call used
in all forms of communication (telemetry,
remote app, InternetinTheCar) . The resulting
problem areas discussed later.

Remote Application Mercedes Me.
Here it shown which requests, IPs and protocols
the smartphone application uses, which
connections established between the vehicle and
the communication servers. The excerpts
provided here intended to illustrate this overall.
The vehicle dealer activated this application
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5. FINDING AND
ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss the results extracted
from our case study as noted in previous section.

5 .1

Collecting the Il\11SI / Il\1EI

IMSI/ IMEI was recorded in areas protected
against radiation from other sources. It was
found that the Mercedes-Benz E-Class has only
one IMSI and transmits via an antenna in the
rear window. The built-in Wi-Fi module
connects as soon as the ignition of the vehicle is
activated. By default, the Wi-Fi module is
activated use for Internet communication with
other devices are possible.
Communication between the
remote
application and the vehicle may take place after
activation by the dealer from whom the vehicle
was purchased. Telemetry data is transmitted
by the user without further activation. The
infotainment / navigation system update is
linked to an optional contract. Through t hese
systems, the area of the live traffic is processed,
which permanently updates traffic mediation,
determined position and calculates optimal
routes. With the vehicle having a TomTom
navigation system installed, t he open access
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from the vehicle DNS server to the TomTom
Server could not be detected.
The installed eSIM in this vehicle can
implement the standards GSM (2G) and UMTS
(3G) and tries to log in to the networks of
Telekom
Germany,
Vodafone
and
02
respectively, i.e. the existing IMSI has no
network lock and may be used as required
register all networks available in Germany.
These dial-up attempts are started as soon as
the vehicle door is unlocked, further interaction
is not required. A data traffic was interrupted
with locked vehicle: this is probably due to the
lack of power flow, as upon unlocking the closing
mechanism direct contact to the DNS server
recursive.ns241. net and thereby contacted to
other servers and existing data. This shows that
remote access to the vehicle, with locked
security mechanisms, is not possible.

5. 2 Export from the
telecommunications system
Data within the telecommunication monitoring
system is assigned to an IMSI or IMEi. Each
connection setup by means of GPRS is assigned
to it data packets. We also noted that the
monitored device is recognized by the user-agent
being used. The user-agent is characterized by
the fact that it represents the operating system
used, the browser and the IT device used.
Besides, due to the non-existent MAC
address of the individual device, data
assignment based on the packet data becomes
impossible. This MAC address is only used for
the internal connection (User Equipment Router on the DSL). Since the information is
collected at the data output of the provider,
these are not available. Therefore, it is
absolutely necessary to store the entire
telecommunications traffic, otherwise the
connection to the used IMSI / IMEi will be lost.
Another storage issue with the existing IMSI
/ IMEi is that they can be cloned or assigned
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multiple times. It is not uncommon today that
in an area where cheap phones exist, an IMEi is
awarded
multiple
times,
because
the
responsibility lies with the device manufacturer.
It is also possible to clone an IMSI with little
effort, but multiple entries in a base transceiver
station are not possible.
A switch within the used 1Pv4 can host
several 100 users. In the telecommunications
records two 1Pv4 are stored, both are internal
IPs. On the one hand an IP for the client itself,
which in this case is in the IP range
10.XX.XX.XX and on the other hand the
network identifier, which is located here in the
range 192.168.XX.XX. Data that is not sent by
the user-agent, does not leave any usable traces
of equipment that can be directly assigned to
the device in the network packets routed
through the provider.

5 .3

Monitoring Wi-Fi module

The Wi-Fi module was monitored during a
highway journey of 07:59:25 and 12:42:24 by
means of the command airodump-ng and
existing data packets were recorded. The aim of
this surveillance was to compare findings from
the monitoring of stationary access points with
this Wi-Fi hotspot to detect any investigation
approaches and to continue to obtain an
estimate of wireless networks during a
motorway journey, as the number of stationary
access points is relatively small. In the higherlevel evaluation of the traffic on this interface,
the following findings emerged (Table 1).
The hotspot acts with a BSSID, which
indicates by default the vehicle brand, the
intended use and a consecutive number.
Because Wi-Fi is switched on by default in the
vehicle, it can detect and monitor from a greater
distance (more than 1000m depending on the
antenna module and environment). A data
reception is eliminated at greater distance, here
we can from a maximum distance of about
200m.
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T able l. Wi-Fi- statistics - mb_lang-hi n.pcapng

Description
Channel

Value
9e:8d:7c:51:99:9c
5

SSID
Percentage of packages
Percentage repetitions
Repetitions
Beacons
Data packets
Probe requests
Probe response
Auths
Dauths
Further
Protection

MB Hotspot 38724
66.994378
11.915921
5822
40128
190
0
8462
2
44
33
Unknown

BSSID

The channel used remained the same
throughout the trial period, this is likely to be
attributed to the fact that the bulk of the
existing AP has channels 1,6,13 as the default
and the company wanted to achieve a channel
with as little access as possible to other access
points for interference-free transmission.
The number of beacons appears extremely
high over a period of 4 hours, the test with an
AVM router was about 1500 beacons per hour,
a test with a VW T5 delivered 14000 beacons
within one hour. Depending on the current state
of knowledge, the transmission of the beacons is
speed-dependent, the faster the vehicle was
moved, the more beacons were sent.
The collected test responses show the high
number of wireless network modules that can be
found on motorways today and the associated
possibilities and risks this poses for security
authorities. Of course, observation and
surveillance missions are possible, so that it
would be possible to build up distance to the
target without losing sight of it. Conversely
security also poses a threat to security agencies.
Units have Wi-Fi routers, hotspots, laptops and
smartphones and can easily identify to their
counterparts. A frame analysis using Wireshark
showed that the communication was completely
handled in the 2.4 GHz range. This seemed

@ 2019 ADFSL

CDFSL Proceedings 2019
surprising at first glance, as the 2.4 GHz
frequency band is being used by several other
networks (e.g. Bluetooth). Reasons for the
restriction to this Wi-Fi frequency range could
be initial costs, the lower energy output (max
100mW) and the compatibility with older
devices.

5. 4

InfoITI1ation content of the
network packets

With regard to the information provided in the
network packets, it should be noted that there
are major differences to normal packet captures.
Entries are blank and aggravate or prevent
automatic analysis of data packets. Especially
in the field of network communication, this
represents a barely surmountable data
mountain. Within Wireshark, for example, there
were no signs of RTP streams, they could not
be captured by the existing analyses tools.
Analyzing path and looking at a connection
, Destinat ion: 11:911:H 11:81:H (N:11:91!1:ll:IN:tl )

Address: Be:11:ta_it :H:ee (H:81:11:88:N:N)
.... .. I ................. • LCibit:Ci\obally
... . .. ,1 .... ........ ,.,,• JGbit:Individui
,. Source: H :H:HJ!ll:11:11 (11:H:H :11:11:111

Address: N:ll:ta_et :11:81 (ll:N:11:88:ff :ll)

Header checks1.11: lx.2S88 (validation disabled]
(Header c~cksua status: Unverifitd]

Source: 18,31.36,58 (18,31.36 , 58)
Dtstination: recursive . ns247 . oet (89 . 238.141.1811
(Sourct ~ IP: Unknown]
(Destination ~IP: lh'lknown)

, r-41Z5:71c,yte5Clnwln{&24b1Ul,71hlttttc:lllreG
•IlllrltU ld: l l H ~ I
lntHIK e

~ =M k -

c.u,111 l1ti ... t ype : £tllemtt (1)

1~~::·~I,;~;~~~~}!·..!~!!.~·~•!!!!.;!!_~~

frame by using Dshell for (IP 10.31.26.50 -> IP
89.238.141.181) we can have the results as in
Figure 2. We also noted that GeoIPs are
missing. A device detection to connect the data
packets with devices and close the evidence
chain cannot be done. This also applies to the
actually existing wireless traffic, which cannot
be implemented as such due to missing frame
contents.
Figure 2. Dshell analyzing of network packets

Because the MAC signature is not
transmitted, this is the only known way to
preserve the MAC of the network module. Since
these are not available within the network
communication of the data stream, a stream
analysis within the network packets is not
possible.

Page 11

Vehicle Communication within Networks ...

5. 5

fusights in.to servers and
impacts

In this topic communication lines in the areas of
telemetry, InternetlnTheCar and smartphone
application were shown. It is an eSIM UMTS
module with the IMSI of the Dutch provider
Vodafone Libertel.

c1

d1
a

b1

b2

0

e1

f1
Legend:
a = recursive.ns247.net 89.238.141.181
b1= recursive.ns247.net 89.238.141.181
b2= recursive.ns247.net 89.238.161.35
c1= Hermes-if.dvb.corpinter.net
195.243.210.46
d1= Ssl-proxy-r55.dvb.corpinter.net 80.156.239.107
e1= Cep-ssl-win.dvb.corpinter.net 80.154.131.251
f1= Subs.snap.dvb.corpinter.net
80.154.131.207
Abnormalities within the connection
a= A one-off knock-on request; no response from the server
b1= Represents the main DNS platform that connects to servers d1, e1,
and f1
b2= Connects to server c1; File contents of servers b1 and b2 are
identical

Figure 3. Connection within the IP data network

Both IMEi and IMSI were not available at
the vehicle branch upon request. This IMSI
establishes its communication via an MSISDN
with the country calling code + 882 39, which
belongs to Vodafone Malta and represents a
catch-all for telephone services and is not
dedicated to a single country.
In the field of telemetry, data transmission
and communication are only possible within the
German territory. Only the DNS server is
operated by M24 7 in England. This is probably
due to the fact that they are working with
Vodafone UK and provide their services on this
network. This would be the only server within
the telemetry data communication outside of
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the scope of German law
subordinate to European law.

but

currently

The integrated systems show that the
(Figure 3) providers of telecommunications
services are broadening their scope of activities
and making their expertise available to car
manufacturers. From participating servers, it
can be assumed that the integrated systems of
Deutsche
Telekom
AG:
hermeslcep-sslif. dvb. corpinter. net,
vehiclewin. dvb. corpinter. net,
ssl-proxyif. dvb. corpinter. net,
subs.snap.dvb.
r55. dvb. corpinter. net
and
. corpinter. net save this data at least
temporarily.
The cooperation between Mercedes-Benz
and Telekom is also reflected in the fact that
only two areas, belonging to the parent
company Daimler, are fully integrated into this
network structure.
Surprisingly, the eSIM Vodafone can be
assigned outside the structure of Mercedes-Benz
/ Telekom. At the beginning of the investigation
preparation, the question arises as to what
extent Vodafone Libertel Netherlands would be
involved in the data flow. The promising, yet
globally, expected answer was "Not at all." The
Internet Service Provider (ISP) is Vodafone US,
which also receives all requests from the client.
The Autonomous System (AS) belongs to
Vodafone Italia, where the answers come back
to the client. The AS is reported in Germany,
Frankfurt / Main, presumably as a result of the
eSIM being activated in Germany.
The MeConnect application from MercedesBenz is divided into its communication
behavior. While the application within the
server structure of the Deutsche Telekom AG
has its information base, presumably due to the
impact on facilities (such as auxiliary heating)
and safety devices (such as locking system). The
MeAccount has been connected to the Daimler
network, as well as the Places and Production
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Suite areas, which will guide him / her through
Akamai Technologies.

5. 6

Further discus5ion

The use of an IMSI catcher was chosen to
capture the complete communication of the
vehicle. Conducting monitoring by logging onto
existing Wi-Fi would not have the desired
outcome, because only the communication for
the connected devices would have been
detected.
By discharging directly from the provider
Vodafone all transmitted data of the SIM card
could be extended. These showed new problems
in their evidential value and meaningfulness. By
recogmzmg
this
problem,
legal
and
technological measures can be taken by the
legislator in cooperation with the provider and
the Federal Network Agency.
Monitoring of the Wi-Fi module has shown
that a large number of Wi-Fi beacons can be
used in the field of reconnaissance and
observation missions in the security regulatory
environment.
Intrusion from outside by crackers of the
password can be ruled out due to the length and
variability (14 characters, Upper, Lower, Digit).
However, it is also possible to create an Evil
Twin and use it [12].
Finally, the localization of the server
structure and the global use of individual
country resources of a provider were discussed.
Here we can still see approaches to receiving
data that were not stored within Germany, but
as in this case, a phone number. The provider
recognized by the IMSI also had no influence or
reference to communication processes and
several globally branched distributions of the
provider and their tasks within the service order
Internetlnthecar could be recognized.
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6. CONCLUSION AND
FUTURE-WORK
The objective of this paper was to examine how
data is generated by a car or routed through the
car's network gateway. Knowledge of this data
flow and its intermediate and final storage
locations enables the security authorities to use
it in preliminary investigations and to assess the
risks of vehicle/ technology use in their own
operational procedures. Data of a vehicle were
collected for this paper. This applies to both
telemetry and remote application data, as well
as the interconnection data of the mobile service
provider. The vehicle data was analyzed and
disseminated using various procedures /
programs to provide a basis for assessing
Internet of Things Mobility infrastructures.
This paper has shown that contents and
communication endpoints can be identified and
further analysis approaches can be made, and
under certain circumstances access and
localization of the vehicle is possible. This also
shows opportunities as well as risks which
security authorities can have in dealing with the
networked mobile areas of the Inter of Things
[17]. In addition, a one-sided processing or
forensic analysis will provide less and less useful
information, only the way of holistic
consideration
will
contribute
to
the
investigation of criminal offenses or to the
protection of one's own forces in the future.
Several times during the paper it was shown
that the generated data throughput leads to the
use of the vehicle, the devices connected to the
Wi-Fi or the smartphone application.
In terms of future work, in order to get a
strong accentuated picture here, a fragmented
data analysis for different vehicle manufacturers
/ groups should be conducted to evaluate them
in context. Furthermore, consideration of the
various domestic and foreign mobile service
providers in this area would be an important
consideration. In addition to the actual data
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flow, the area of data (intermediate) storage
would be of decisive importance here.
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